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Introduction
This paper constructs a dynamic equilibrium growth model, in which some …rms act as monopsonies on the labor market. Bhaskar, Manning and To (2002) give many arguments in favor of the assumption of oligopsony competition in labor market. They review the main theoretical arguments that all use static frameworks. Introducing monopsony power in a dynamic growth model allows to study its impact on capital accumulation, and to reveal paradoxical e¤ects: for instance, a technical progress may decrease capital accumulation if it leads to distortions due to imperfect competition.
We consider an economy populated by …rms that di¤er by their productivity. Firms with the lowest productivity are competitive as their technology is freely available. A few number of …rms hold an exclusive technology with a higher productivity, and have a non-competitive behavior. Indeed, if all …rms behaved competitively, only the …rm endowed with the most productive technology would be active in equilibrium. But the assumption of perfect competition would become meaningless with only one …rm on the market.
The most productive …rms realize that they hold some market power on the labor market, and take into account the impact of their demand for labor on wages.
We thus obtain an equilibrium with strategic (oligopsonic) behaviors in the labor market. This type of behavior tends to reduce the equilibrium wage and to increase the gross interest rate. In a growth model, capital accumulation depends on savings rates on capital income and wage income. The non-competitive behavior of …rms will then imply a change in capital accumulation that will depend on these two savings rates.
In this framework is studied the impact on capital accumulation of a technical progress. In a competitive economy, this impact is always positive. In a noncompetitive model, the impact can be positive or negative, depending on its e¤ect on monopsony power. Taking as …xed all productivities, we study in details the impact of a technical progress that bene…ts to a non-competitive …rm and a technical progress a¤ecting the competitive sector. Finally, in a last part a simple example is studied in which productivities may vary across time through innovations. At each period, one …rm may bene…t from a random innovation that increases its productivity by some given factor. The innovator has an exclusive use of its technology during one period, but it becomes freely available after. In this context, the occurrence of an innovation can have a negative short run impact on the growth rate, because imperfect competition decreases the equilibrium wage. But, after one period, the e¤ect is positive as the technology is available for the competitive sector.
Little work has been done that introduces monopsony into a dynamic general equilibrium models, in spite of the importance of monopsony in the labor market. On the other hand, some authors have focused on non-competitive behaviors on the capital market in dynamic general equilibrium models, mainly Sorger (2002) and Becker (2003) . In these models, …rms are perfectly competitive and consumers behave non-competitively in the capital market. A long run equilibrium exists in which consumers endowed with di¤erent rates of time preference hold positive amounts of capital.
The imperfect competition mechanism that we introduce in this paper can also be viewed in the line of Cournot-Walras equilibrium (Gabszewicz and Vial 1972; Codognato and Gabszewicz 1993) . Recent papers have used this concept in various frameworks. Belan, Michel and Wigniolle (2002) show that it can be fruitful to interpret pension funds behavior. Belan, Michel and Wigniolle (2005) wonder if imperfect competition can foster capital accumulation in a developing economy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the game played by noncompetitive …rms. Section 3 studies households' behavior. Section 4 presents the intertemporal long run equilibrium. Section 5 analyses the impact of an exogenous technical change on capital accumulation. Section 6 concludes. The most complex proofs are available in the appendix of the working paper (d 'Onofrio and Wigniolle 2006) , and also upon request.
The productive sector
First we de…ne the equilibrium concept. Second, the existence of an equilibrium is proved. Third, the impact of imperfect competition on equilibrium prices is studied.
De…nition of the equilibrium concept
We consider an imperfect competition concept in the line of the Cournot-Walras equilibrium. At each period t occurs a game consisting of three steps. In a …rst step, households allocate their savings between the di¤erent …rms, arbitrating between the di¤erent capital returns. At the second step, the non-competitive …rms choose their labor demand (their strategic variable). In the third step, an equilibrium occurs on the labor market that determines the equilibrium wage.
We now make precise the assumptions regarding the productive sector. Firms employ capital and labor. Capital depreciates fully in one period. There exist two types of …rms: competitive and non-competitive. Competitive …rms have the same Cobb-Douglas technology given by:
Without loss of generality, it is possible to consider only one competitive …rm, and we denote by K 0;t and L 0;t its amounts of capital and labor.
There exist m non-competitive …rms respectively endowed with Cobb-Douglas production technologies given by:
We assume the following inequalities: A 0 < A 1 < ::::: < A m : The lowest productivity corresponds to a basic technology which is freely available, and …rms using this technology have a competitive behavior as they are numerous 1 . A few number of …rms bene…t from a higher productivity that may result from a past innovation. As each of them has an exclusive use of its own technology, it is natural to assume that they have non-competitive behaviors. We will assume along the …rst part of the paper that this production structure is identical at all periods.
At the beginning of period t; the total amount of capital K t is allocated by households among the di¤erent …rms. This capital stock results from period t 1 savings behavior and for the moment, K t is assumed to be given 2 . In period t; the households who hold the capital stock of …rm i (0 i m) share the pro…t according to their capital contribution. The resulting payo¤ per unit of capital for them is:
We assume that households are atomistic and behave competitively. They take R i;t as given and invest their savings in …rms providing the highest returns R i;t : Using these assumptions, the three steps of the game are the following.
1. At the beginning of period t; consumers allocate their savings K t among the di¤erent …rms i; 0 i m :
2. Their capital stock being installed, the m non-competitive …rms choose their labor demand (L 1;t ; ::
3. There is an equilibrium on the labor market. This equilibrium is reached when the competitive labor demand of …rm 0 is equal to the remaining quantity of labor after the decision of non-competitive …rms, or
As it is usual in Cournot-Walras competition, the strategies of non-competitive …rms are constrained by (2) in such a way that an equilibrium exists. By assumption, …rms i = 1; :::; m are the only strategic agents. Firm 0 and consumers behave competitively.
The game is solved by backward induction. From step 3, the equilibrium condition on the labor market de…nes the equilibrium wage as a function of the demands of labor by non-competitive …rms L i;t , i = 1; :::; m:
2 Households'savings behavior is described in section 3.
From step 2, each non-competitive …rm i maximizes its pro…t, taking into account the impact of its labor demand on the equilibrium wage:
The optimal choice of L i;t is such that 3 :
The third term of this equation stems from the non-competitive behavior.
Finally, from step 1, all capital returns must be equal:
and the total capital stock is shared between all …rms:
In order to characterize the equilibrium of the game, it is convenient to introduce the following notations: q i = A i =A 0 ; l i;t = L i;t =K i;t ; i;t = l i;t =l 0;t ; p i;t = K i;t =K t and p i;t = p i;t =p 0;t : Equation (5) can be written:
Dividing by A 0 l 0;t we obtain:
The equality of capital returns for each …rm (6) de…nes the gross return on savings R t :
Dividing by A 0 l 0;t we obtain the equation:
Finally, the allocation of total capital on the di¤erent …rms (7) leads to:
Equations (8), (10) and (11) allow to characterize the equilibrium of the game. 3 The concavity of the pro…t function with respect to L i;t is satis…ed, as the second derivative is
Existence of the equilibrium between non-competitive …rms
In this section, we prove that our equilibrium concept leads to a unique equilibrium, and we describe its properties. We …rst remark that (8), (10) and (11) de…ne a system of 2m + 1 equations for 2m + 1 variables, and that these equations do not depend on the period t: Consequently, 8i = 1; :::; m; i;t ;p i;t and p 0;t are constant variables, that we will write further i ;p i and p 0 : From equation (8), we obtain that i is such that:
Equation (10) has a unique solution i such that i < (q i ) 1= ; and this solution de…nes i as a decreasing function of q i : Moreover, as q i i > 1; (10) implies that:
Thus, i < 1: We have …nally proved that all non-competitive …rms have a smaller labor-capital ratio than the ratio in the competitive sector. The more productive a non-competitive …rm is, the smaller its labor-capital ratio is, as i is a decreasing function of q i . This property results from the higher market power of the more productive …rms: they reduce their labor demand in order to decrease the equilibrium wage.
As for all i = 1; :::; m; i is well-de…ned, we deduce from (8) the value ofp i ; 8i = 1; :::; m :p
which is an increasing function of q i : Finally p 0 is given by (11), and is a decreasing function of q i : The share of capital held by …rm i p i is given by:
which is an increasing function ofp i ; and therefore an increasing function of q i :
We have …nally proved that, for each value of total capital, there exists a noncompetitive equilibrium in which all …rms are productive. The higher the productivity of a …rm is, the higher the share of capital that it employs at equilibrium is and the lower its labor-capital ratio will be. It is worth noting that, in an equilibrium with perfect competition, only the most productive …rm would be active. With imperfect competition, the more productive …rms strategically diminishes their labor demand to decrease the equilibrium wage. This behavior exerts a positive externality on less productive …rms, which employ a higher labor-capital ratio, and which can attain the same level of capital productivity.
Equilibrium prices
At period t; K t being the total capital stock and N t the number of young people, it is possible to determine the equilibrium level of the wage w t and the gross interest rate R t :
From the labor market equilibrium, we have:
Finally, with k t = K t =N t denoting the ratio of capital per young agent, we obtain from (11):
In an economy with perfect competition, we would obtain X = 1: In our economy with imperfect competition, we have X < 1 as i < 1: For the competitive …rm, the equilibrium labor-capital ratio l 0;t is higher than its value for a perfectly competitive economy 1=k t :
We can then deduce the values of the equilibrium wage (3) and gross interest rate (9):
In these two equations, the variable X results from imperfect competition. As X < 1; we see that imperfect competition tends to decrease the equilibrium wage, and to increase the gross interest rate, with respect to the case of perfect competition with the less productive technology.
Households'behavior
The production sector is part of a standard overlapping generations model with altruistic agents, based on Diamond (1965) and Barro (1974 )-Weil (1987 . Agents are living for two periods. The size of generation t is N t and each agent has (1 + n) children. Parents care about their children's welfare. The utility of a generation t agent, V t , is given by
c t and d t+1 respectively denote …rst period and second period consumptions. In their …rst period of life, individuals born in t work and receive a wage w t . In addition to their wage income, they receive a bequest x t from their parents. They consume c t and save an amount s t : Gross returns on savings are equal to R t+1 : at equilibrium, all …rms provide the same return on capital. In their second period of life, people receive returns on savings and allocate net resources between consumption d t+1 and bequests x t+1 to their (1 + n) children. Thus
Bequests must be non-negative :
Maximizing the utility V t under the constraints (14), (15) and (16) leads to the standard …rst-order conditions
(
The second condition holds with equality if x t+1 > 0. When bequests are constrained at all periods (8t; x t = 0), equation (17) with a log-linear utility function leads to the simple saving function:
In the long run, the economy reaches a steady state that is called egoistic long run equilibrium. When bequests are positive, it is well known that the economy converges towards the modi…ed golden rule steady state:
We call altruistic long run equilibrium this steady state. Using a logarithmic instantaneous utility function, capital accumulation only depends on the equilibrium wage in an egoistic steady state, and on the gross return of capital in an altruistic steady state.
The intertemporal long run equilibrium
Two types of long run intertemporal equilibria may exist: an altruistic equilibrium with operative bequest (x > 0) and an egoistic equilibrium (x = 0).
At an altruistic long run equilibrium, the capital per young agent ratio k t converges towards a value k; which is determined by (13) and by the modi…ed golden rule (20): R = A 0 k 1 X 1 = (1 + n)= ; or:
Along an egoistic long run equilibrium, the capital per young agent ratio k t converges toward a value k ; which is determined by (12) and by the savings behavior of the agents (19): (1 + n)k = aw; or:
In both equations (21) and (22) the impact of imperfect competition on capital accumulation results from the variable X < 1: Within an altruistic steady state, capital accumulation in the long run only depends on the return of capital. As imperfect competition tends to increase the gross interest rate, the capital per young agent ratio k is higher than under perfect competition. In contrast, within an egoistic steady state, capital accumulation in the long run only depends on savings that only depend on the equilibrium wage for a log-linear utility function. Thus, as imperfect competition tends to decrease the equilibrium wage, the capital per young agent ratio k is smaller than under perfect competition.
The condition ensuring positive bequests in Weil (1987) remains the same in our framework. The steady state will be altruistic if k > k ; or (1 )aX < : As X is smaller than 1; this condition shows that the existence of an altruistic steady state is furthered by imperfect competition. This property was expected as imperfect competition tends to increase the return to capital .
Technical progress and capital accumulation

Increasing productivity of a non-competitive …rm
We …rst study the impact of an increase of some A i ; i 1: This is equivalent to consider that some q i increases, for i 1: Such technical progress will a¤ect capital accumulation through the variable X: It is worth noting that X has an opposite e¤ect on the two types of steady states, altruistic or egoistic. An increase of X diminishes k and rises k : As a benchmark, we know that a technical progress in a competitive economy always increases capital accumulation, in both types of long run equilibria.
Proposition 1 it is possible to de…ne some increasing function (q) with (1) = 0; such that, for each q i ; i = 1; ::::; m; the interval K i = (1; q i + (q i )) satis…es:
1. If for all j 6 = i; q j 2 K i ; @X @q i < 0: An increase of q i rises k and diminishes k : These results show that a technical progress can have various e¤ects on capital accumulation. The …rst case is obtained when all …rms j have a productivity parameter q j close to q i (close in the sense that q j 2 (1; q i + (q i ))). The second case is obtained when q 1 is su¢ ciently small with respect to q 2 ; q 3 ; :::q m : Therefore, the impact of a technical progress on capital accumulation depends on two components: on the initial productivity of the …rm experiencing a technical progress with respect to other …rms, and on the type of long-run equilibrium -egoistic or altruistic.
This latter component can be understood, having in mind that the rise of productivity of a non-competitive …rm has opposite e¤ects on factors remuneration at equilibrium: if the equilibrium wage increases, the rate of return decreases and vice versa. Therefore, if capital accumulation increases for an egoistic steady state, it will decrease for an altruistic one and conversely.
The former component can be explained, as an increase of one …rm's productivity leads to two opposite e¤ects. First, the …rm reduces the quantity of labor used per unit of capital. This e¤ect tends to decrease the equilibrium value of the wage and to increase the capital return. Second, since all capital returns are equal at equilibrium, the …rm holds a higher share of the total capital of the economy. If the …rm that bene…ts from this productivity increase is the most productive (i = m), this second e¤ect acts in the same sense as the …rst one. Therefore, the equilibrium wage decreases and the capital return increases. But, if the …rm that bene…ts from this productivity increase is not the most productive one (i < m), the second e¤ect acts in opposite direction to the …rst one, and the global e¤ect is ambiguous. Particularly, it is proved that for the less productive non-competitive …rm, it is possible that a rise in its productivity increases the equilibrium wage and decreases the capital return.
Increasing productivity in the competitive sector
We study the impact of an increase of A 0 on both types of stationary equilibrium k and k : From (21) and (22), A 0 has a direct e¤ect and an indirect e¤ect via the variable X: Indeed, increasing A 0 implies a decrease for all q i , i 1:
The following proposition shows that an increase of A 0 can have various e¤ects on capital accumulation.
Proposition 2
1. When q m ! +1;
< 0: By continuity, these properties hold when the q i ; i 1; are su¢ ciently close together.
These results show that when the total factor productivities of non-competitive …rms are close, an increase of A 0 tends to increase capital accumulation in an egoistic steady state, and to decrease capital accumulation in an altruistic steady state. This e¤ect results from the increase of the wage and the decrease of the capital return. In contrast, the results may be reversed when the total factor productivities of noncompetitive …rms are distant.
The direct e¤ect of an increase of the productivity in the non-competitive sector is a rise of both wage and capital returns. But an indirect e¤ect stems from the fall of the relative productivity of all non-competitive …rms, which modify their market power. If non-competitive …rms have close productivities (case 3), the productivity increase in the competitive sector implies a fall in the market power of all non-competitive …rms, which causes an increase of wages and a decrease of capital returns. If non-competitive …rms have distant productivities (cases 1 and 2), the productivity increase in the competitive sector redistributes market power in favor of the most productive …rms, and to the detriment of the less productive ones. The resulting e¤ect on capital accumulation may be reversed with respect to case 3.
Growth with random innovations
In this last section, we provide a simple extension of the model, introducing random innovations. We assume that at each period, with a probability ; one …rm receives an innovation (and with probability 1
; no innovation occurs in the whole economy). This innovation increases the productivity by a factor > 1; with respect to the common technology. Finally, each innovator has an exclusive use of its new technology during only one period. After that period, there is free access to this technology.
From the preceding assumptions, at each period t; either the economy is purely competitive and the common productivity is A 0;t ; or one non-competitive …rm has a productivity level A 1;t = A 0;t while the other …rms are competitive with the common productivity A 0;t :
We only consider the egoistic equilibrium in this part, as we want to analyze the dynamics of capital accumulation. The dynamics of k t with random innovations can be written:
(1 + n)k t+1 = a(1 )A 0;t k t X t :
With probability (arrival of an innovation in t):
X t = x 1 + x(x 1) with x > 1 the solution of = x 1 + (1 )x A 0;t+1 = A 0;t With probability 1 (no innovation in t):
X t = 1 A 0;t+1 = A 0;t As x > 1; we have x 1+x(x 1) < 1: The arrival of an innovation has a negative short run e¤ect on the growth rate, because imperfect competition decreases the equilibrium wage. But, after one period, the e¤ect is positive as the technology is available for the competitive sector. The greater the size of the innovation is, the larger both short run and long run e¤ects will be. This simple example shows that a technical progress can have two paradoxical e¤ects in the short run: …rst, it can cause a fall in capital accumulation; second, it can increase the share of GDP devoted to capital income and decrease the share devoted to labor income. These two e¤ects result from the non-competitive behavior of innovating …rms.
Conclusion
This paper has studied how long run growth can be a¤ected by strategic behavior of …rms in the labor market. The main results show the paradoxical e¤ects associated with imperfect competition: a technical progress may decrease capital accumulation if it leads to distortions due to imperfect competition.
Our work could lead to further developments, mostly in endogenizing the technical progress by an explicit innovative activity of the …rms. Growth models in which innovation is the source of growth are natural frameworks to develop our analysis, since they make endogenous productivity di¤erences of …rms.
